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References to moral exemplars run deep into the history of philosophy, as we find them 
featured in rather disparate context and approaches which span from virtue ethics to moral 
perfectionism, from existentialism to moral particularism. In the varied and growing 
contemporary literature on moral exemplarism, we find a number of options that can be 
brought down to the two rather broad yet distinctive categories of theoretical and anti-
theoretical approaches. In the paper, I showcase and contrast these two varieties by taking 
the views of Zagzebski and Rorty as representative of, respectively, the reference to 
exemplars as most perfect beings to aspire to and get guidance from, and the use of them as 
next yet foreign beings to experiment with and get provocation from. Finally, I will draw 
some consequences for a conception of moral education hinged on unsettlement and 
transformation rather than on imitation and reproduction. 
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1. MORAL EXEMPLARISM BETWEEN THEORY AND ANTI-THEORY 
The contemporary orthodoxy in moral philosophy has variously committed 
to a version of isolationism, bracketing our first order moral views from their 
philosophical account: that is, the tools and strategies to investigate the most 
general shape of the moral life should not be influenced by one particular 
picture of it on pain of jeopardizing the impartiality of our meta-ethical and 
normative theories alike, hence turning moral reflection into moral preaching 
of sorts. This theoretical model has been attacked from a number of corners 
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by the so-called “anti-theorists”1, who argued against what they take to be the 
impossible and eventually pernicious task of peeling off one‟s substantive 
conceptions of the good life from one‟s philosophical accounts of it – a 
maneuver which, according to this heterodox approach, often conceals 
precisely those very foundationalist agendas and ambitions moral theorists 
themselves wove against the moralizers2. With its stress on the importance of 
exemplar beings in both shaping one‟s conduct and revising one‟s views about 
how to live up to ethical standards, moral exemplarism sits rather well with, 
and can be read as belonging to, this feast of anti-theoretical approaches 
critical of mainstream moral theorizing, or so I will argue. In fact, according to 
this approach, moral thinking and acting move from the confrontation with 
embodied excellent human existences that might or might not inspire us and 
enlighten our conducts in the particular situation we find ourselves in, rather 
than with allegedly neutral templates which we should accept or reject 
independently from the standpoint we occupy – templates that nevertheless 
represent but one precise picture of the moral life as pumped by our allegedly 
pre-philosophical moral intuitions3. Furthermore, the very modality and goals 
of moral inquiry is different: while moral theorists seek moral justification and 
prescriptions via impersonal argumentations, exemplarists seek moral insight 
and transformation via personal confrontation. 
While acknowledging the force and opportunity of an exemplarist approach 
to ethics, I distinguish two main varieties of it: a broadly theoretical one – most 
articulately and effectively defended by Linda Zagzebski – based on the 
centrality of the excellence of the exemplar‟s virtues, and a broadly anti-
theoretical one based on the centrality of the relationship we establish with the 
exemplar – which I find congenially articulated in the later work of Richard 
Rorty. While the former hinges on our capacity to recognize and possibly 
 
1 For the manifesto and classical statement of anti-theory, see Williams 1985, and Clarke 
and Simpson 1989; for a criticism, see Louden 1992; for a recent, critical assessment of the 
whole debate, see Fotion 2014.  
2 By moralism I here mean both the promotion of one precise moral option in disguise – to 
be distinguished from the inscription of moral significance into moral reflection itself – and the 
extension of moral considerations by means of philosophical imposition beyond the boundaries 
of what is ordinary felt as pertaining to the range of the moral – to be distinguished from the 
open-endedness of the moral. The multi-faced and wide-ranging topic of moralism has been 
explored in several of its nuances by Taylor 2012.  
3 The battle over moral intuitions is also quite lively, and has been recently reinvigorated by 
the clash between experimental philosophers and their critics. For a survey and proposal 
congenial to the perspective advanced here, see Koopman 2012. On these themes, see also 
Lecaldano 2009. 
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duplicate the excellent life we read in the words and deeds of the exemplar, 
driven by the admiration for and aspiration to their lives, the latter hinges on 
our willingness to be reshaped by our real or imaginary conversations and 
engagement with such lives, driven by self-scrutiny and self-knowledge. While 
the former has among its key quests those of defining what exemplars are, how 
to individuate them and imitate them, the latter is interested in the 
relationship we establish with them and in how we are possibly displaced and 
transformed by them.  
I claim that it is exemplarism of the latter breed that we should endorse if 
we don't want to ultimately fall back to the prescriptivist, theoretical 
conception of moral thinking that exemplarism should be critical of. That is to 
say, it is only when exemplarism is made anti-theoretical that we can prevent it 
from becoming yet one more arrow in the moralist‟s quiver, thus jeopardizing 
its fierce opposition to abstractedness, on the one hand, and over-commitment, 
on the other. What I aim at disclosing is a space for moral reflection which is 
both morally committed (in the sense of not being morally neutral) and yet not 
morally charged (that is moralistically driven), where exemplars play the role 
of those very (concrete as against rarified) devices for moral education through 
which we explore and possibly transform our understanding and practice of 
our moral life without being given one to be inculcated from without through 
strokes of prescriptions.  
After sketching the blueprint of Zagzebski‟s theoretical model (§2), I shall 
voice a number of concerns about some of its metaphilosophical and ethical 
implications (§3), and eventually turn to an different, anti-theoretical rendering 
of exemplarism as inspired by a line of reasoning drawn from Rorty (§4). Some 
very general conclusions about the nature and scope of philosophical ethics 
and some gestures towards the future path to travel will round things up (§5). 
2. EXEMPLARS AS EXTRAORDINARY BEINGS 
In a number of recent writings (most notably, 2010 and 2017), Linda 
Zagzebski sketched a very sophisticated and skillfully knitted up theory of 
moral exemplarity through which she aims to reclaim the centrality of 
extraordinary (virtuous) beings to moral judgment and moral education. Her 
goals are not so much descriptive and suggestive, but rather prescriptive and 
foundational in spirit: by offering a categorization and evaluation of the 
various directions in which exceptionality can be reached and most 
importantly admired and longed for, she sketches a meta-ethics as well as a 
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normative theory of moral value and conduct. Moral exemplars do show what 
goodness is as well as urge us to realize it.  
This combo is presented under the auspices of a “radical kind of virtue 
theory [she] call[s] „exemplarism‟, which is foundational in structure but which 
is grounded in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to which anchors 
all the moral concepts in the theory” (2010, 41). Zagzebski‟s foundationalism is 
then grounded on the direct reference to exemplars and the normative role of 
the universal emotion of admiration. According to this scheme, narratives and 
tales are those very features of our ordinary moral practices through which we 
reinforce our confidence in referring to the right kind of people, and such 
identification is one pre-theoretical aspect of our moral practices that theory 
must explain and account for. Narratives and tales link the a priori element of 
moral theory (that is, foundationalism) to the practical aspect of our moral 
lives though (that is, exemplarism), as Zagzebski remarks at several stages, the 
resulting theory amounts to no manual for good deeds but rather to something 
closer to a moral map (2010, 43ss) which is up to the various individual to 
interpret and put to use. Exemplars possess a distinctive deep psychological 
structure that makes them maximally good or excellent, and that we can and 
should carefully observe, even if this natural or acquired endowment might 
well change among exemplars and through time. We educate the normative 
emotion of admiration through reflection and further experience, and in so 
doing we cherish and emulate those extraordinary individuals who handle us 
maps to get around and live by. 
Now, Zagzebski notices how admiration and desire are two distinct aspects 
of goodness, as we admire things we don‟t desire, and desire things we don‟t 
admire. As against Aristotle, admiration (which opposite is contempt) is 
depicted as primary to desirability: according to Zagzebski‟s exemplarist 
moral psychology, key to the moral life is the will (and often obligation) to 
model ourselves on whom we want to be like. Admiration is a motivating 
emotion that tracks how things are in the world, and, in this sense, 
“admirable” works as a thick concept, with the descriptive part as inseparable 
from the evaluative one. Zagzebski writes: 
The test of whether someone is admirable is always that we admire her on 
reflection and continue to admire her after we obtain more information about 
her and reflect on our emotion and the emotions of those we trust. If the test of 
reflective admiration shows that some of these hypotheses need to be revised, 
then that will change the way we go about identifying exemplars. (2017, 64) 
Exemplarity is pictured as a high (actually, maximum) degree of excellence 
that calls for and prompts our admiration, where this procedure is depicted as 
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a-posteriori and experimental, and yet not without normative guidance and 
predictability. The distinction between natural (admired but not imitable) and 
acquired (admired and imitable) excellences is more important than that 
between intellectual and moral virtues (both acquired). Zagbeski pictures 
moral expertise in terms of a sharing of a sense of importance as conveyed in 
our shared yet shifting narratives and story-telling about who the admirable 
figures are, and contrasts – or, better, compares – this capacity to our shared 
yet not so shifting practices of empirical and scientific discrimination and 
judgment:  
There must be…a socially recognized procedure for picking out instances of the 
relevant kind. For biological and chemical kinds, we have experts whose job 
includes identifying instances of the kind. For moral exemplars, we have 
different procedures embedded in our practices, particularly the telling and re-
telling of stories. We learn through narratives of fictional and non-fictional 
persons that some individuals are admirable and worth imitating, and the 
identification of these persons is one of the pre-theoretical aspects of our moral 
practices that theory must explain (2017, 15) 
It follows that the modality of moral learning is that of mimesis or 
emulation: “Admiration is internally linked to emulation: the moral learned 
admires the person she emulates. Admiration explains why she would want to 
be like the person she emulates, not just for the pleasure of imitation, but 
because she sees the person she emulates as good” (2017, 135). Emulation leads 
the learner to acquire a good motive since she “sees her individual self in the 
admired person…In projecting oneself into the image one then enacts, one 
gradually becomes the person one wants to be” (2017, 136).  
This model of moral learning hinges in turn on something akin to a 
principle of “linguistic division of labor”, where once again cognitive as well as 
conative qualities and abilities are distributed according to a shared sense of 
social roles and expectancies. Zagzebski writes: 
Moral reasoning is a role assigned to certain individuals in a society – typically, 
philosophers and theologians…Some people are “experts” at moral judgment 
because of their moral wisdom and insight; others are “experts” at providing the 
reasoning supporting the judgments of the wise. Ordinary people are expected 
to grasp a small part of that reasoning, but they are not expected to have the 
ability to give extended arguments any more than they are expected to give an 
explanation of the chemical structure of gold. A virtuous person need not be 
adept at moral reasoning, but her judgments would track moral truth and be 
justifiable by a community as a whole. (2017, 149-150) 
Narratives serve “the critical semantic function” of “connecting the users of 
moral terms to a causal network linking them with the extension of the term” 
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(2017, 187). According to this picture of moral education, and unlike the case 
of objects and concepts dealt with by the natural sciences, there is 
moral/linguistic privilege without authority inbuilt in the principle of linguistic 
division of labor, so depicted: 
Empirical scientists have the role of finding out how widespread the extension 
of a virtue term is, how changeable the extension is (whether virtuous persons 
tend to remain virtuous), and whether there are any connections between the 
extension of one virtue term and another. I think that philosophers also have 
specialized functions that include making the functioning of the network clearer 
and pointing out inconsistencies in the stereotype, in addition to contributing 
their powers of abstract reasoning to the community…Moral philosophers have 
the specialized function of providing the reasoning that justifies the judgments 
of exemplars…The people who deserve to be linguistically privileged are the 
people who are good at distinguishing true exemplars from the counterfeits, and 
who are good at spotting counterfeit virtues (2017, 188 emphasis mine) 
Moral philosophy is then depicted as a somewhat specialized activity of 
backing up what we ordinarily acknowledge as morally significant, so to clear 
the ground of inconsistencies (ordinary or otherwise?) and oversee the 
establishment of (intellectual or otherwise?) connections among judgments 
and responses. 
The hero, the saint, and the sage, unlike the genius (mostly because of her 
natural endowment as opposed to the acquired skills of the others4), are the 
three epitomes of, respectively, courage, dedication and wisdom, which they 
train and display for us to admire. These three figures are accompanied as 
many different understanding and practice of flourishing, exhibiting a 
peculiar model of exemplarity hinged on the excellence in their respective 
chief virtue. Flourishing, as in the best Aristotelean teaching, “has much to do 
with a sense of self in which there is a connection among one‟s life activities” 
(2017, 175). We admire lives that are harmonic, and not just rhapsodic or 
extemporary acts. The more so as it is only through the reference to such lives 
that we see this or that particular act as morally salient and worth desiring5. 
Finally, we admire acquired and sustained dispositions moved by the 
concern for others, more than those fleeting and temperamental ones moved 
by self-interest, and that has to do once again with the fact that in order for the 
 
4 The contrast with moral perfectionism is here particularly and dramatically stark, as I will 
reprise later. For a model of moral upbringing and uplifting hinged on geniuses – understood, 
after Emerson and after Cavell, as made and found in relations rather than given in nature –, 
see Donatelli 2018. 
5 For a fine discussion and integration or Zagzebski (and others), see the recent work by 
Vaccarezza and Croce 2016 and Croce and Vaccarezza 2016. 
111  Two Varieties of Moral Exemplarism 
 
 
exemplars (and for us, after them) to care for others they need to engage and 
challenge their own self, which chiefly means overcoming egoism and embrace 
some form of altruism. Working for and with others in fact minimally requires 
coordinating with them and being there for them, and that is no small burden 
in itself. These virtues and qualities thus carry the best part of the moral 
weight because of their perceived difficulty and commitment: the more effort, 
the more admiration, and hence the more exemplarity and moral value. Not to 
mention that such activities generate their own secondary rewards and 
applause in that they create new webs of relationships to be admired and 
longed for6. I only mention this feature of Zagzebski in passing as, despite its 
importance, for my purposes it plays a slightly less significant role, although I 
will reprise it at a later stage when questioning the morality/prudence divide 
lying behind it.  
3. EXEMPLARS LOST AND FOUND: OR, ON THE VIRTUE OF 
DISPLACEMENT 
In my admittedly raw and highly selective sketch of Zagzebski, I was 
interested in highlighting the idea according to which our most genuine and 
powerful (a posteriori) relation with exemplars is one of admiration for their 
qualities (virtues) as shown in their lives and acknowledged via direct reference 
yet mediated by stories and narratives. Now, my chief worry is that Zagzebski‟s 
picture of admiration leads straight into a model of moral education as 
imitation or simulation rather than as exploration and transformation, and for 
the worse of it. The choice between the two is not merely terminological, and 
rather amounts to metaphilosophical as well as ethical divergences: it has to do 
with what we expect from moral philosophy and its relationship with the 
moral life altogether. In the one case, in fact, exemplars call for an a posteriori 
yet reproductive model, while in the other for an a posteriori and generative 
one. 
Let me briefly articulate this difference with reference to an alternative 
understanding of what exemplarity might mean: what I will call a hortatory or 
exhortative approach7. An hortatory approach seeks to go beyond descriptive 
 
6 It is perhaps interesting to notice how nowhere in her work Zagzebski gives weight to 
considerations about the evolutionary opportunity of altruism, despite those are indeed part 
and parcel of our variegated stories and narratives about who we are and where we might be 
going (our forms of life) – and, note, this is quite different from using those considerations as 
heuristic evidences of our alleged constitution and its shortcomings (our human nature). 
7 For a fuller presentation and assessment, see Marchetti forthcoming. 
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ethics (telling us what ethics consists in) and prescriptive ethics (instructing us 
how to best implement it): ethics has rather to do with an unbroken work of 
self on self in which we check, challenge, and revise our inherited moral 
sensibility and views midst problematic situations. Exemplars here feature as 
those very geniuses whom, by crafting a way of their own for their self to 
survive and thrive, offered us precious material about who we might become 
to ponder over and act upon. It is in this sense that moral philosophy, that is 
moral philosophers, should exhort us to find and make these representative 
individuals and ourselves through them: individuals whose constitution is 
mobile as ours so should be. While we find this picture cashed out in rather 
different ways throughout the history of philosophy, I will here spin the story 
as told by a pragmatist line which makes reference to Rorty and some of his 
philosophical heroes: Emerson, Nietzsche, James, and Dewey8).  
Now, according to this hortatory picture, admiration, rather than as an 
emotion, should be thought of as a mood leading to a particular line of self-
conduct: rather than having an object (the admired exemplar) and moving us 
to imitate her (reproduction), it colors our perception and judgment and 
makes us question our very evaluative mindset (as in critique). Admiration is 
then more of a behavior than of a psychological state. Bildung, according to 
this picture, should not be thought of as the imitation of a model but rather as 
an open-ended experimentation with one‟s individuality in the light of a 
further being to question and achieve. 
One of the key feature of this picture is Dewey‟s notion of morality as 
springing from the problematic situation in which we find ourselves in and for 
which we still have to find a breakthrough – where prudence is called such 
situation in which a solution has been already found and socially accepted, 
and only in need to be kept following. According to Dewey, moral philosophers 
should not be dealing in the justification or strengthening of our moral 
practices (from within or without those very practices), but rather in the 
deepening of them and the exploration of alternative ones when the problems 
we are dealing with seem to be recalcitrant to the tools we treat them with9. 
This is the pragmatist core of hortatory ethics, where pivotal is the striving to 
achieve what one might become through self-clarification and transformation, 
and conformism depicted as the chief threat to the liveliness of our moral 
selves. If ethics is then a practice of self-caring, exemplars are among the most 
 
8 A kindred reading of Rorty as a pragmatist rooted in the romantic tradition is to be found 
in Goodman 2008. 
9 Among many texts, see Dewey 1983 and 1985. For a line of reading once again akin to the 
one adumbrated here, see Goodman 2007.  
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precious devices through which we might perform this rather demanding task. 
Exemplars are thus not raw models showcasing excellent lives to imitate, but 
rather often conflicting companions in the quest for coming back to oneself 
and possibly find ourselves otherwise. 
As a first thing, then, if anything, it is us who create the exemplars, rather 
than the other way around. Compare here with Zagzebski, who writes that 
“the deeper psychological structure of a person who does admirable acts is 
what makes the person admirable” (2017, 61). Hence her delving deep into the 
respective psychologies of the excellent saints, heroes, and sages: useful and 
fascinating for sure, but missing the target altogether if severed from the kind 
of needs and interests we admirers have for those biographies. Contrary to this 
view, we might want to claim that exemplars become admirable in the course 
of admiring them, because of a need we have and a relationship we establish 
with them. They prompt admiration from us because of something they do to 
us, rather than because of something they are anyway. Plus, it is us who in the 
end do something with them by investing them with value – what, exactly, this 
value is, I will say in the next section. If this is a case, then perhaps the theory 
of direct reference as employed by Zagzebski is not a good model for moral 
exemplarity – or overall, as gold or even water can be said to be what we make 
of them, as the natural goods/artifact divide is porous to say the least: think of 
the works of art or to metaphors – ; a model better to be replaced with a 
relational understanding of exemplarity as provocation and invention.  
This resonates quite well with a line of thinking we find in the early James 
comparing natural and social selection in the wake of Darwin‟s genealogical 
revolution. For James, in order for “great men” to be turmoil and enzymes of 
society, they need to prepare the environment so to make its very 
transformation possible in the first place:  
[The environment] chiefly adopts or rejects [the great man], preserves or 
destroys, in short selects him. And whether it adopts and preserves the great 
man, it becomes modified by its influence in an entirely peculiar and original 
way. He acts as a ferment, and changes its constitution […]. If anything is 
humanly certain it is that the great man‟s society, properly so called, does not 
make him before he can remake it (1979, 176) 
James is here calling attention to the opportunity (if not necessity) to think 
of exemplars as those very fertile seeds upon which new ground can be 
broken, where the soil itself, in order to nourish the seeds, needs to be 
ploughed for the good in a virtuous, transformative circle. Nietzsche has a fine, 
kindred line in this regard concerning our deferring to strong thinkers in 
ordinary and critical moments alike, only to recognize that it is us practical 
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beings who constantly make and remake themselves anew according to our 
needs and deeds. He writes: 
The higher human being deludes himself: he calls his nature contemplative 
and thereby overlooks the fact that he is also the actual poet and ongoing author 
of life […]. It is we, the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make 
something that is not yet there: the whole perpetually growing world of 
valuations, colors, weights, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. This 
poem that we have invented is constantly internalized, drilled, translated into 
flesh and reality, indeed, into the commonplace, by the so-called practical 
human beings (our actors). Only we have created the world that concerns human 
beings! (2001, 170)  
Now it is us who make what Rorty, after Nietzsche and Harold Bloom, calls 
the strong poets as much as they make us since we engage in a conversation 
with them whose rules and results are not written in stone but are rather part 
and parcel of the very process of acculturation and growth. Dewey is once 
again very much the reference here, as he characterized moral inquiry as 
“growth of conduct in meaning” (1983, 194) from within our particular 
standpoint. Through engaging exemplars we strive to get a better angle on our 
own thoughts and deeds, one from which overlooked assumptions won‟t go 
without checking and petrified conducts become fluid again and possibly 
undergo dramatic reshaping. As James wrote, “philosophical study means the 
habit of always seeing an alternative, of not taking the usual for granted, of 
making conventionalities fluid again, of imagining foreign states of mind” 
(James 1978, 4). The states of mind of the exemplars, called for by the 
philosophers given their achieved facility in seeing and thinking otherwise, are 
mobile through and through, and related to one‟s sense of self as an agent of 
change. 
Now, it has to be noted, agency is important for Zagzebski as well, but for 
reasons quite different from those I am suggesting here. She indeed writes that 
“To the extent that we believe or come to find out that the source of an 
admirable act is something independent of agency of the person, we admire 
the person less or not at all” (2017, 61). But, I would add, we admire what we 
take as an acquired talent rather than a natural one because we praise what we 
read as the work on the self of the exemplar, a work we might perform 
ourselves; however, it should not be forgotten that also natural talents, in order 
not to be dissipated, must be worked out time and again. Sometimes, in fact, 
we nurture them despite our hating and resisting them and the more so if we 
do, as e.g. in the case of Andre Agassi‟s dramatic yet captivating troubled 
relationship with his natural talent for tennis, which brought him to despise 
himself (and those closer to him) and keep fighting himself despite also 
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cultivating himself: that is, finding and losing himself in the best part of 
himself.10 
We admire acquired excellence, then, not so much because of the effort it 
took to achieve it by the exemplar, but rather because it showcases the sense of 
possibility inbuilt in our moral lives against which measuring our moral 
sensibility and sense of self. In this picture, the telling and re-telling of 
narratives aims at our checking and enrichment of our own inherited moral 
baggage rather that at the individuation and refinement of the proper moral 
response. We re-describe ourselves in the light of the exemplars who disrupt 
and stretch our very sense of self: individuals who displace and replace us as 
much as they displace and replace themselves. The motive to admire them is 
not the wish to be like the exemplar, but rather the hope to be transformed by 
her and by our relationship with her. We don‟t want to become them (because 
they epitomize virtue and goodness), but rather to attain a wider and perhaps 
deeper perspective on our own selves through them. This is the difference 
between derogation or elevation and engagement or transformation. For 
Zagzebski we admire the perfectly good or virtuous, while for this pragmatist, 
hortatory line we admire the unbroken work of self on self to dislocate and 
ameliorate oneself informing exemplarity. 
This difference issues in a diverging conception of the self and its unity. 
Zagzebski claims that “a desire to have a consistency and continuity of ego 
that consciously integrates one‟s past self into one‟s present and future self and 
where one‟s beliefs, desires, values, and over behavior are harmonious” is one 
of the marks of integrity of exemplars. “To get it, exemplars often resist 
cultural forces that would push them along in ways determined by other 
people […]. There is an important way in which exemplars do not change […], 
or if they change, they change in a way that is self-directed” (2017, 179). Once 
again, this sounds important and yet problematic: the consistency Zagzebski 
describes can also take place when we integrate one‟s past self into one‟s 
present by acknowledging the breaks and inconsistencies in one‟s path – this is 
what Rorty (1990) famously called “irony”, that is the keeping together a hold 
on what one was and is with the sense of radical contingency of such path–, 
and the resistance exemplars shows is to the idea of values as established from 
without our practices. Communality, then, rather than Reality (note the 
capital) is then what defines the very shifting yet definite boundaries of the 
moral. If this is the case, then, the self-directing character of change is not a 
matter of holding fast to certain excellent ideals, but rather of welcoming the 
 
10 See Agassi 2010. 
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prospect that each and every of us is the very centerpiece of moral 
understanding and moral revolution. 
One‟s life as a whole is then important both for Zagzebski‟s theory and for 
the hortatory (anti-theoretical) picture I am here sketching, but in radically 
different ways: for her exemplars‟ whole lives matter because of their “sense of 
purpose” and “striving for something of ultimate concern” to be equally 
longed for, while for pragmatism they do because of their leading a path of 
their own which might inspire and transform us. This issues in a radically 
different view of autonomy: while for her autonomy amounts to trusting 
authorities and depending on others we have reason to trust (Zagzebski, 150), 
for hortatory ethics it amounts to self-reliance. Self-reliance makes reference to 
the quest to trust ourselves but also to finds one‟s lost or alienated voice due to 
the weight and exhaustion of tradition and conventions.  
As already remarked, it is quite telling that while Zagzebski does not take 
into consideration genius as a type of exemplarity (but only heroes, saints, and 
sages), it is exactly on geniuses that a line running from Mill and Emerson, 
through James, Dewey and Rorty hinged moral exemplarism. For Mill, the 
genius is the one who does not left possibilities untried, and for whom the 
higher activities – that is those which call for a transformation of self – are 
bread and butter of her ordinary way of facing the world and others11. For 
Emerson, the genius is a friend and better self: not the maximally good or fit 
but rather the figure unsettling us and yet empowering us by reminding us 
what we might have forgotten and enlightening us about what we might 
become. As he famously remarked,  
In every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts; they come 
back to us with a certain alienated majesty. Great works of art have no more 
affecting lesson for us that this. They teach us to abide by our spontaneous 
impression with good-humored inflexibility then most when the whole cry of 
voices is on the other side. Else to-morrow a stranger will say with masterly good 
sense precisely what we have thought and felt all the time, and we shall be forced 
to take with shame our own opinion from another. (Emerson 2000, 132-3) 
The alienated majesty of which Emerson speaks of consists in the sense of 
human possibility and closeness of the work of genius to oneself: that is the 
proximity and yet distance of my current self from my next one and the fear 
and shame to take such leap. Exemplars are there for us when we feel such 
resistance, and in paying attention to them we pay attention to what we might 
 
11 On Mill‟s perfectionism, see Donatelli 2006. 
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have become if only we were brave and open to such strangeness and 
unsettlement. 
If this is the case, then linguistic moral competence is then not only a matter 
of mastering concepts and knowing how to use them, but also of changing 
them and imagining them anew. Moral concepts are not the things we need 
experts for like in the case of scientific ones. We don‟t so much need surveys 
about how terms are currently used, but rather genealogies of how they have 
started to circulate, how they shifted meaning in order to build up a sense of 
what we ourselves might make of them. What we need philosophers the most 
is not detecting true exemplars, telling them from wannabes and working out 
the credentials and details of their affiliation, but rather to get rid of those 
pictures which depict exemplarity as inhabiting a dimension alien to our 
ordinary capacities for self-constitution and transformation by employing 
newer vocabularies. This actually chimes quite well with what Zagzebski (2017, 
189-192) claims about shifts in moral vocabularies and linguistic moral 
communities, thought not with her saying that it is the wise person only who 
we should trust when deciding whether to push for agreement and a common 
vocabulary, or rather not to (2017, 211). 
Zagzebski‟s theory of exemplars, in the end, seems in need of a substantive 
backup of values to do the mileage she wants it to: but where do these values 
come from? As we saw, she denies the need for any conceptual foundation, but 
only direct reference to how we ordinarily and communally pick out 
exemplars. Yet, that would seem to rule out cases of exemplars who do not 
show any such feature but who are seen as exemplary nonetheless – I discuss a 
case below. So, where to look for such backup, if we ourselves claimed that 
exemplarity has to do with what we make of certain excellent features rather 
than with their very possession or lack thereof? A hint, surely in need of 
further elaboration, comes from Rortian corners, and has to do with the idea 
that what we admire the most in exemplars, and hence what constitutes value, 
is their very embodied ability to escape moral closure and denounce moral 
certainty. 
4. SPIRITUAL EXERCISES AND ORDINARY MORAL EDUCATION 
In one rather unknown piece (2010), Rorty speaks of some great writers12, 
among which he lists Henry James and Marcel Proust, as nothing less than 
 
12  It is significant that, in this text as well as elsewhere in his work Rorty contrasts 
philosophical with literary and religious texts, charging them with different aspirations and 
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“spiritual exercises” through which getting redemption from the quite 
unfortunate state of “egotism” (as opposed to egoism) in which we all variously 
swim. The rationale and background of Rorty‟s proposal is a conception of an 
ethics “without principles” (2000) hinged on the activity of self-redescription 
and transformation through the arts – understood, very broadly, as basically 
anything which is not currently considered a science, even if the sciences as 
well can offer us great narrative through which re-describing ourselves, as e.g. 
in the case of evolutionism. For Rorty we don‟t need a foundational model 
through which justify morality, but rather a set of reminders and provocations 
which would prompt us to deepen or challenge our own understanding of it 
and reworking ourselves accordingly. In exposing ourselves to (what we see as) 
exemplar beings we do not necessarily feel to emulate them, but rather enlarge 
our moral imagination and experiment with our own moral aptitudes and 
aptness13.  
Egotism consists for Rorty in the assumption that one has already secured a 
place from which to judge and make correct (that is wise, virtuous) moral 
choices, and the one whole purpose of hortatory ethics is questioning such 
acceptance of moral certainty or at least our confidence in it: 
People read religious scriptures and philosophical treatises to escape from 
ignorance of how non-human things are, but they read novels to escape from 
egotism. “Egotism”, in the sense in which I am using the term, does not mean 
“selfishness”. It means something more like “self-satisfaction.” It is a willingness 
to assume that one already has all the knowledge necessary for deliberation, all 
the understanding of the consequences of a contemplated action that could be 
needed. It is the idea that one is now fully informed, and thus in the best 
possible position to make correct choices (2010, 394-5). 
Exemplars take this certainty and confidence away from us and put our 
entire moral background of assumptions and regularities before us for critical 
examination and revision. While according to the orthodoxy moral philosophy 
gives us reasons for doing something (say, be altruistic rather than egoistic), for 
Rorty reading James or Proust it gives us a practice of self-questioning. Novel 
reading is then a spiritual exercise (among others) attempting to undo us and 
 
purposes, and yet in the context of the present argument such demarcation does not play a 
great role since despite exemplars can be showcased in literary as opposed to philosophical and 
religious texts, still one could argue that philosophy, once made literary, can still play the 
exhortative role of calling for transformation and critique. Rorty‟s text is itself a case of a 
philosophical text aimed at such rethinking and adjustment of moral reflection along non-
foundational lines. 
13 I have touched upon these topics in Marchetti 2016, where I contrast and integrate 
Rorty‟s pragmatist angle on moral progress with Cora Diamond‟s Wittgensteinian one. 
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redo us by upsetting one‟s sense of what matters most and how to achieve it. 
“Following certain figures and characters might lift up the heart by letting the 
reader overcome the immaturity, confusion, and incoherence of her days” 
(Rorty 2010, 405). 
Now, it is clear that this is a non-foundational approach all the way down: 
one which finds little room in Zagbebski‟s picture (and in the orthodoxy of 
moral philosophy more generally). Agency and luck alone cannot explain in 
full the achievements of individuals or their communities, or even fix and 
exhaust what is valuable in their lives: a great share of importance is due to the 
capacity and coincidence to have endured a number of situations (problematic 
or apparently smooth alike) and having taken them all in. Exemplars are then 
not experts of sorts, then, as in morality there is (or, rather, there would better 
be) no derogatory work, but only a constant activity of deepening the words, 
concepts, and practices one lives by. This amounts to, among other things, the 
resistance of the divide between appearance and reality (as in “I am leading 
such a life, but is this life really good?”), in favor of a practical distinction 
between more or less intelligent (that is, experimented with) ways of 
conducting oneself. In this picture, exemplars are then suggestions of what we 
might have been, what we might become, and of what might have been wrong 
all along. In Rorty‟s words: 
Seen in this light, what novels do for us is to let us know how people quite 
unlike ourselves think of themselves, how they contrive to put actions that appall 
us in a good light, how they give their lives meaning. The problem of how to live 
our own lives then becomes a problem of how to balance our needs against 
theirs, and their self-descriptions against ours. To have a more educated, 
developed and sophisticated moral outlook is to be able to grasp more of these 
needs, and to understand more of these self-descriptions (2010, 393). 
Rorty marks a difference between a religious culture (and more generally a 
picture of ethics as achieving the proper human form), here epitomized by the 
life of the saints, and a literary culture (and more generally a picture of ethics 
as enlarging the human landscape), here epitomized by Proust: 
The big difference between the Proustians and the Catholics, and more 
generally between the religious and the literary cultures, is that devotional 
reading emphasizes purification rather than enlargement, getting rid of 
distractions rather than incorporating them in a larger unity. Novel-reading, on 
the other hand, aims at encompassing multitudes rather than eliminating 
superfluities. (2010, 406) 
Examples of such spiritual exercises are Proust or James and their books, 
but even great movies or tv series, in which we are exposed and why not 
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admire troubling and troubled characters. No wonder Zagzebski denies that 
we can admire someone radically evil, since admiration is for her a positive 
feeling with the desire to emulate. As she writes, “I am interpreting admiration 
as focusing on the possession of good in the other person and the possibility 
that I can acquire it myself” (Zagzebski 2017, 52). As a constrast, in Rorty‟s 
view you can indeed admire such figures precisely because their longing can 
be quite painful and unsettling. Once again, we don‟t admire them as raw 
models to emulate but as exercises of the imagination to engage in to check 
ourselves and possibly recast ourselves otherwise. 
Can then an exemplar be vicious rather than virtuous? For Zagzebski she 
can‟t, as we would need to admire the exemplar because of her goodness (that 
is, for how she exemplifies it), but exemplars could also be people we don‟t feel 
sympathy for but who still spur us and educate us to better ourselves. It is in 
this sense that exemplarity is somewhat uncodifiable, and seems to be resisting 
even the most open-ended casuistry: there is no template for the exemplar but 
only a risky and uncertain relationship with her. For Zagzebski, “what we 
admire in exemplars is their integrated self, a self that harmozises all aspects 
of their psyche” (2017, 155), but someone like the dedicated family man and 
drug lord Walter White (the fictional character from the AMC series Breaking 
Bad) had such selves although they will hardly count as exemplars for her. 
What we find exemplar and hence moral captivating and instructing in the 
character of Walter White is his transformation and recasting, his own 
redemption from the egotism of knowing exactly what the right thing to do is 
and which place to occupy in order to be able to see and take it. These figures 
challenges their own sense of morality and moral bounds, and in so doing they 
expose themselves to moral transformation and ourselves through them. How 
can a dedicated and father and husband even start to think a shift from high 
school chemistry classes to international narco-traffic? And how is it that the 
many reasons he gives to himself and to the ones closest to him (us included, 
watching the show and taking part in his life and struggle) start changing 
dramatically and eventually turn upside down? What has he found and made 
along the way? Apparently, the greatness of such character lies precisely in the 
radical character and distance of his path with reference to our supposedly 
shared sensibility as conveyed in stories and narratives which forged our very 
sense of morality. And what are we to make of his journey overall? This would 
also explain because, while Zagzebski puts much weight on the concern for 
others as a mark of morality and moral excellence, hortatory ethics depicts 
ethics as hinged on self-cultivation and perfectibility, where altruism is not the 
necessary goal of moral education, but rather one of its possible outcomes. 
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5. ORDINARY EXEMPLARS AND THE MORAL LIFE 
As a way of conclusion, this heterodox, anti-theoretical understanding of 
exemplarism trades the reference to – and invocation of – exemplars as the 
most perfectible and excellent specimen of their category (the saint, the hero, 
the sage) with the attractiveness to – and experimentation with – exemplars 
(the genius) as those who are capable to make us thinking, reacting and 
conducting ourselves differently given their own tentative reconstruction of a 
moral path within their ordinary condition. This shift reflects a deeper move 
from a conception of ethics as the foundation of the moral life to ethics as the 
critical exploration and handling of the very boundaries of what we thought 
our moral life to be like: while in the one case we look up at exemplars for 
moral guidance and direction, the in the other we let them look back at us for 
moral interrogation and transformation. Future research on the key topic of 
moral exemplarity would better include references as well as uses of 
individuals whose greatness lies exactly in not knowing what morality is 
anymore, so to start building up together a conception of it from the ground 
up in an unbroken activity of moral recasting: uplifting, downsizing, and 
eventually discovering ourselves us anew. 
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